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This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to grant a Writ of
Extraordinary Relief concerning a Board of Pardon's imposition of a sentence at an
original parole hearing. Petitioner asks this Court, de novo, to end the illegal activity
of the Board of Pardons
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals transferred from the Utah Supreme Court). Mr.

Whiteman appeals the final order and judgment of the Honorable L.A. Dever, Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County involving a review of Board of
Pardons procedures concerning it sentencing duties.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the ruling on Labrum v. Utah State Bd. Of Pardons, 870 P.2d
902, 910 (Utah 1993) violates the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pursuant
to Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The appropriate standard of review is for correctness.
When reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, we accord no deference to the conclusions of law that underlie the
dismissal. There are reviewed for correctness. However, while "we must
review the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing
function, . . . we do not sit as a panel of review on the result."
Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103-1104 (Utah 1994) (internal citations omitted).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[Included herewith in Addendum A.]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case;
This case arises from an appeal of a dismissal of a Petition For Writ Of

Extraordinary Relief. (R. at 143-149) (Addendum B). The order was entered on May
2

24, 2004. A notice of appeal was entered on May 17, 2004 following the court's
minute entry of April 23, 2004.

II.

Course of the Proceedings:
This matter commenced on January 6, 2004 when Mr. Whiteman filed a

Petition For Writ of Extraordinary Relief challenging the board of pardon's decision
regarding errors brought to its attention by Mr. Whiteman, who was not represented by
counsel at the original parole hearing nor at the special attention hearing following. (R
at 1-29). On March 17, 2004, Friel opposed the petition by a motion to dismiss
claiming that the Board exercised a discretionary function and that any other outcome
regardless of errors is only tenuous. (R. at 70-120).

III.

Disposition in Trial Court:
No trial was conducted, nor was an evidentiary permitted even though

requested. (R. at 1-8). This matter was disposed of by notice to submit for decision
without a hearing. (R. at 130-132). Mr. Whiteman did not challenge the findings of
the court.
IV.

Statement of Facts:
A jury convicted Petitioner of murder, a first degree felony. On November

22, 1993, he was sentenced to a maximum mandatory term of five-years-to-life. On

3

November 12, 1996, the Board held an original hearing which resulted in a rehearing set
for April 2003. On April 5, 1999, Petitioner's sentence was amended, showing a change
from a "maximum mandatory term of five years and which may be for life" to a "not less
than five years and which may be for life." In preparation for the April 5, 1999 hearing, a
new Presentence Investigation Report was prepared. Petitioner requested a
redetermination hearing. The Board conducted a Special Attention Review. After
considering the information Petitioner provided, the Board determined not to change the
previously scheduled April 2003 rehearing. Petitioner was informed that in assessing the
guidelines/matrix, the Board "considers sentences imposed on convictions in other states,
not whether the other state calls the offense a misdemeanor or felony. This is based on
the fact that felonies and misdemeanors differ from state to state. An offense Utah might
classify as a felony, California may classify as a misdemeanor. So, if the sentence
imposed by California corresponds to a Utah felony sentence, the offense is counted as a
felony on the matrix. Your matrix/guidelines have been configured with the new
presentence investigation report, but no change was made in the final guideline time." On
April 10, 2003, the Board conducted a rehearing and decided to parole Petitioner on April
6, 2004. The Board also ordered two special conditions of parole: (1) cooperate with
transitional services which may include a Community Correctional Center as directed by
Adult Probation and Parole; (2) successfully complete mental health therapy to address
substance abuse and cognitive restructuring issues. (R. at 144-145).

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this matter, Mr. Whiteman was deprived of counsel at the original
hearing of the Board of Pardons. Had counsel been afforded, at that time consistent
with Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967), no error
would have resulted. The necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts,
introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the
defendant to present his case as to sentence is appropriate. Id.
At the time of Mr. Whiteman's original hearing, noone aided Mr.
Whiteman to correctly present mitigating evidence concerning the sentence
enhancement stemming from his California misdemeanor offenses.

ARGUMENT
MR, WHITEMAN WAS NOT AFFORDED COUNSEL AT THE
ORIGINAL HEARING BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS,
IN VIOLATION OF MEMPA v. RHAY.
In this matter, Mr. Whiteman presented his challenge of Board of Pardons
practice of enhancing out-of-state misdemeanors to felony status for the purpose of
imposing a sentence. (R. at 2). The only defense to that claim raised by Friel is that
the practice is a discretionary function. (R. at 74-75). The practice is apparently
unchecked due to the absence of defense counsel when consideration is being weighed.

5

Since 1913, Utah has employed an indeterminate sentencing system under which trial
courts do not sentence offenders to a determinate term but impose a statutorily
prescribed range of years. Act of March 24, 1913, ch. 100. 1913 Utah Laws 192;
Labrum v. Utah St. Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). Under Utah's
current system, "the board of pardons determines the actual number of years a
defendant is to serve." Labrum, 870 P.2d at 907. "For all intents and purposes,
adoption of this indeterminate sentencing system transformed the Board from an agency
having the ability to shorten a prisoner's judge-determined sentence into an agency
with power analogous to that of a court to actually impose a sentence." Neel v.
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994).
Due to the fact that the Board has taken on a judicial function, it is
undisputed that a Board's decision of whether to grant parole does implicate the
offender's liberty interest because at the time an offender first comes before the Board,
no term of incarceration has been fixed. Neel, at 1101. Because of the reasoning
offered in Neel that a liberty interest is at risk before the Board on an original hearing,
the practices of the Board must include the right of an offender to have counsel
consistent with the reasoning by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967).
In Mempa, the Court extended the right of counsel language to include the
right to sentencing hearings. Mempa, a board of prison terms and paroles case itself,
6

challenged to the State of Washington's practice of considering sentencing entered into
without counsel after probation had been revoked. After Mr. Mempa was convicted,
he filed a petition for habeas corpus, which the State Supreme Court denied.
At issue in that case was that a hearing, a probation officer presented
hearsay evidence to the effect that Mr. Mempa had committed the acts alleged in 14
separate counts of forgery and 14 separate counts of grand larceny that had been
charged against petitioner previously at the time of his arrest. The court thereupon
revoked probation and imposed the maximum sentence of 15 years-apparently a fixed
determined sentence.
In this matter, it is clear that Petitioner and others similarly situated would
benefit substantially from having counsel represent them in the Board's original
hearing. In example, the Board's records show Mr. Whiteman was not credited any
mitigating damages. (R. at 85). Certainly, it is indisputable that prior misdemeanor
convictions in California rather than felony status offenses in Utah is a clear mitigating
factor that should have been considered and likely would have if counsel was afforded
before the Board. Also, Mr. Whiteman's alleged felony status offenses in California,
there is no evidence in the record that they were truly felony status in Utah nor is there
record evidence that like in Mempa, if the alleged conduct was the acceptance of a plea,
whether counsel was afforded at that time, or whether the conviction was the result of a
revocation. (R. at 95-100).

7

CONCLUSION
Mr. Whiteman has been unjustly treated in this matter. This trial court
should have granted Mr. Whiteman is requested relief, including an evidentiary
hearing. Clearly, the Utah Board of Pardon's abused its discretion by assuming facts
not in evidence. It was an abuse of discretion to assume the facts relevant to the
California misdemeanors were in deed felony status offenses. Meanwhile, as argued
hereinabove, Mr. Whiteman has raised a substantial issue on appeal that warrants a
reversal by this Court and direction for the future. Counsel should be permitted to
appear, provided, or otherwise afforded at Board original hearings because a liberty
interest is at issue.

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS NOTICE,
Notice is hereby given that this appeal is to exhaust his state remedies,
before presenting the matter to U.S. District Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of October, 2004.

D. BRUCE OLIVER

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 25th day of October,
2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for
the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Annina M. Mitchell
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

A?
D. BRUCE OLIVER
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ADDENDUM A
(Constitutional Provisions, Statutes)

Amend. VI

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

41 Am. Jur. Trials 349, Habeas Corpus: Pretrial Rulings, §§ 16-24 (Double jeopardy)

53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249, Proof of
Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel.

Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
Cross References
Right to jury trial, criminal cases, see U S C A Const Art III, § 2
Library References
C J S Declaratory Judgments § 155
C J S Federal Civil Procedure §§ 943 to
954
C J S Juries §§ 6 to 279, 284, 286, 292,
302 to 303, 306, 310, 354 to 356, 367,
409, 443 to 447, 450 to 456, 459 to
C J S Witnesses § 6

Criminal Law <&=>106 to 114, 577 1 to
577 16(11), 641, 662
Jury <&>9 to 37
Witnesses @»2
Westlaw Topic Nos 110, 230, 410
C J S Criminal Law §§ 177 to 186, 277, 578
to 608, 610 to 621, 1115, 1120

952,
299,
396,
461

Research References
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding post-plea remedies, 1 3 A L R 4 t h 5 3 3
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding prior convictions, 14 A L R 4 t h 2 2 7
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding right to and
incidents of jury trial, 3 A L R 4th 601
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues, 12 A L R 4th 318
Appealability of federal court order denying
motion for appointment of counsel for indigent party, 67 A L R Fed 925
Appointment of counsel, in civil rights action,
under forma pauperis provisions (28
U S C A sec 1915(d)), 69 A L R Fed 666
Circumstances giving rise to prejudicial conflict of interests between criminal defendant
and defense counsel—federal cases, 53
A L R Fed 140
Closed-circuit television witness examination,
61 A L R 4 t h 1155
Comment Note —Constitutionally protected
right of indigent accused to appointment of
counsel in state court prosecution, 93
ALR2d747
Condition interfering with accused's view of
witness as violation of right of confrontation, 1 9 A L R 4 t h 1286

ALR Library
Accused's right, under 28 U S C A sec 1654
and similar predecessor statutes, to represent himself in federal criminal proceeding,
27 A L R Fed 485
Accused's right to represent himself in state
criminal proceeding—modern state cases,
98 A L R 3 d 13
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client—Issues of incompetency,
69 A L R 5th 1
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client—Pretrial conduct or conduct at unspecified time regarding issues of
insanity, 72 A L R 5th 109
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding appellate and
postconviction remedies, 15 A L R 4th 582
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding entrapment defense, 8 A L R 4 t h 1160
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding guilty pleas, 10
A L R 4th 8
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding hypnosis and
truth tests, 9 A L R 4th 354
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of cnminal client regarding plea bargaining, 8 A L R 4th 660
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Art. 1, § 12

PECLARATION OF RIGHTS
1953,78-12-25.5, Const. Art 1, § 11. Klatt v.
Thomas, 1990, 788 P.2d 510 Appeal And Error
*» 1177(1)

Sec. 1 2 .

[Rights of accused persons]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule m
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Laws 1994, S J.R 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995.
Cross References
Rights of defendant, criminal procedure, see § 77-1-6

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Confrontation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, Allred, 1986 Utah L Rev 75 (1986)
Death Qualification and the Right to an Impartial Jury Under the State Constitution Capital Jury Selection in Utah after State v Young
Knapp, 1995 Utah L Rev 625(1995)
Determining Whether Miranda Warnings are
Necessary Utah's Definition of Custody 1997
Utah L Rev 137 (1997)
T^
I T > T
rx,,
EHvmmg the Framers Intentions The Immunity Standard tor Criminal Proceedings Under
1^ ^/oCn°/!Jf tUtl°n' B°WerS' 200° U m h L
Kev l i b (2000)
Hansen v Owens-Expansion
of the Privilege
Against Self-incrimination to Unknown Limits,
Young, 1981 Utah L Rev 447 (1981)
Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection Strickland v Washington and
National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, O'Brien, 1985 Utah L Rev 723
(1985)

KUTV v Wilkinson Another Episode in the
Fair Trial/Free Press Saga, Hagen, 1985 Utah L
Rev
739 (1985)
Restraints on Defense Publicity in Criminal
Jur
T Cases> S w i f t 1 9 8 4 U t a h L R e v 4 5 <1984)
State
v
Herrera The Utah Supreme Court
u es m
C
* [
£a™; 0 ^ h ' "
f ^ f 5 ^ 1 / ? ^ ! ?
De fense S t a t u t e
22
L 221
( 996
'
J^^P
J \
c
State v 1 nomas and the McDonougn l e s t A
Safety Net Proposal to Cure the Square PegL
Round H o k Dllemma| Joner
1993 B Y U
j ^ e v 1347 (1993)
Toward a
Framework for Assessing When a
Defendant is Capable of Knowingly and Intellig e n u y Waiving the Right to Counsel 1994 Utah
L Rev 325 (1994)
U t a n Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, Marsden, 1986 Utah L Rev 319
(1986)
Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Implications,
Michie 15 J Contemp L 81(1989)
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CHAPTER 27
PARDONS AND PAROLES
Section
77-27-1.
77-27-2.
77-27-3.
77-27-4.
77-27-5.
77-27-5.3.
77-27-5.5.
77-27-6.
77-27-7.

Definitions.
Board of Pardons and Parole—Creation—Compensation—Functions.
Repealed.
Chairperson and vice chairperson.
Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
Meritless and bad faith litigation.
Review procedure—Commutation.
Payment of restitution.
Parole or hearing dates—Interview—Hearings—Report of alienists—Mental competency.
77-27-8.
Record of hearing.
77-27-9.
Parole proceedings.
77-27-9.5. Victim may attend hearings.
77-27-9.7. Victim right to notification of release—Notice by board.
77-27-10.
Conditions of parole—Rulemaking—Intensive early release parole program.
77-27-10.5. Special condition of parole—Penalty.
77-27-11.
Revocation of parole.
77-27-12.
Parole discharge, sentence termination.
77-27-13.
Board of Pardons and Parole—Duties of the judiciary, the Department of
Corrections, and law enforcement—Removal of material from files.
77_27-14.
Repealed.
77-27-15.
Repealed.
77_27-16, 77-27-17. Repealed.
77-27-18 to 77-27-21. Repealed.
77-27-21.5. Sex offender registration—Information system—Law enforcement and
courts to report—Registration—Penalty—Effect of expungement.
77-27-22, 77-27-23. Repealed.
77-27-24.
Out-of-state supervision of probationers and parolees—Compacts.
77-27-25.
Amendments to interstate compact—Transfer of prisoners—Costs—Supplementary agreements.
77-27-26.
Deputization of agents to effect return of parole and probation violators.
77-27-27.
Retaking or reincarceration for parole or probation violations—Hearing
and notice to sending state—Detention of parolee or probationer.
77-27-28.
Hearing officer.
77-27-29.
Rights of parolee or probationer—Record of proceedings.
77-27-30.
Violation by parolee or probationer supervised in another state—Hearing
in other state—Procedure upon receipt of record from other state.
77-27-31.
Short title.
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 1 . Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(2) "Commission" means the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment after
conviction.
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
450
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§ 77-27-1
Note 1

(5) ' 'Expiration' ; occurs when the maximum sentence has run.
(6) "Family" means persons related to the victim as a spouse, child, sibling,
parent, or grandparent, or the victim's legal guardian.
(7) "Panel" means members of the board assigned by the chairperson to a
particular case.
(8) " P a r d o n " is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting a
person from punishment for a crime.
(9) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions which,
if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, enables the parolee to obtain a
termination of his sentence.
(10) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or
execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions.
(11) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution of
the sentence.
(12) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging from
parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the expiration of
the sentence.
(13) "Victim" means:
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or class A
misdemeanor offense, and regarding which offense a hearing is held under
this chapter; or
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the offense for
which a hearing is held under this chapter.
Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; L a w s 1985, c. 198, § 6, L a w s 1 9 8 8 , c. 172, § 1; L a w s 1990, c.
195, § 1; L a w s 1994, c. 13, § 3 1 ; L a w s 1996, c 100, § 3, eff. April 2 9 , 1996.
Cross References
Pardon and parole board, governor's powers, see Const Art 7, § 12
Paroled persons, termination or discharge from sentence, see § 76-3-202
Law R e v i e w and Journal C o m m e n t a r i e s
May, Victims' Rights and the Parole Hearing,
15 J Contemp L 1\ (1989)
N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
In general

1

• In general
A "parole" is in the nature of a grant of
partial liberty or a lessening of restrictions to a
convicted prisoner, and the granting of a parole
does not change the status of the prisoner but
merely allows him greater freedom of moveftient while serving sentence, and he is still
legally in custody Utah Code 1943, §§ 67-0-7,

67-0-8 McCoy v H a m s , 1945, 108 Utah 407,
160 P 2d 721 Pardon And Parole @=» 41, Pardon And Parole <©=> 24
^ parolee is still in custodia legis and under
control of the state board, though outside pnson
wall, and until the sentence is terminated the
judgment committing him to custody of pnson
authorities is still in effect Utah Code 1943,
§§ 6 7 - 0 - 7 , 6 7 - 0 - 8 McCoy v Harris, 1945, 108
Utah 407, 160 P 2d 721 Pardon And Parole ®=>
24
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§ 77-27-2
§ 7 7 — 2 7 - 2 . Board of Pardons
Functions

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
and

Parole—Creation—Compensation-

(1) There is created the Board of Pardons and Parole. The board shall
consist of five full-time members and five pro tempore members to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate as provided in this section.
The members of the board shall be resident citizens of the state. The governor
shall establish salaries for the members of the board within the salary range
fixed by the Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, State Officer Compensation.
(2)(a)(i) The full-time board members shall serve terms of five years. The
terms of the full-time members shall be staggered so one board member is
appointed for a term of five years on March 1 of each year.
(ii) The pro tempore members shall serve terms of five years. The five
pro tempore members added by Subsection (1) shall be appointed to terms
that both commence on May 1, 1996, and respectively end on February 28,
1999, and February 29, 2000. These terms are reduced by two and one
years respectively so that the appointment of one pro tempore member
expires every year beginning in 1996. Terms previously set to expire will
now expire the last day of February of their respective years.
(b) All vacancies occurring on the board for any cause shall be filled by the
governor with the consent of the Senate pursuant to this section for the
unexpired term of the vacating member.
(c) The governor may at any time remove any member of the board for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance or malfeasance in office, or for
cause upon a hearing.
(d) A member of the board may not hold any other office in the government of the United States, this state or any other state, or of any county
government or municipal corporation within a state. A member may not
engage in any occupation or business inconsistent with his duties.
(e) A majority of the board constitutes a quorum for the transaction of
business, including the holding of hearings at any time or any place within or
without the state, or for the purpose of exercising any duty or authority of the
board. Action taken by a majority of the board regarding whether parole,
pardon, commutation, termination of sentence, or remission of fines or
forfeitures may be granted or restitution ordered in individual cases is
deemed the action of the board. A majority vote of the five full-time
members of the board is required for adoption of rules or policies of general
applicability as provided by statute. However, a vacancy on the board does
not impair the right of the remaining board members to exercise any duty or
authority of the board as long as a majority of the board remains.
(f) Any investigation, inquiry, or hearing that the board has authority to
undertake or hold may be conducted by any board member or an examiner
appointed by the board. When any of these actions are approved and
confirmed by the board and filed in its office, they are considered to be the
action of the board and have the same effect as if originally made by the
board.
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(g) When a full-time board member is absent or in other extraordinary
circumstances the chair may, as dictated by public interest and efficient
administration of the board, assign a pro tempore member to act in the place
of a full-time member. Pro tempore members shall receive a per diem rate
of compensation as established by the Division of Finance and all actual and
necessary expenses incurred in attending to official business.
(h) The chair may request staff and administrative support as necessary
from the Department of Corrections.
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), the Commission on Criminal
and Juvenile Justice shall:
(i) recommend five applicants to the governor for appointment to the
Board of Pardons and Parole; and
(ii) consider applicants' knowledge of the criminal justice system, state
and federal criminal law, judicial procedure, corrections policies and
procedures, and behavioral sciences.
(b) The procedures and requirements of Subsection (3)(a) do not apply if
the governor appoints a sitting board member to a new term of office.
(4)(a) The board shall appoint an individual to serve as its mental health
adviser and may appoint other staff necessary to aid it in fulfilling its responsibilities under Title 77, Chapter 16a, Commitment and Treatment of Mentally 111
Persons. The adviser shall prepare reports and recommendations to the board
on all persons adjudicated as guilty and mentally ill, in accordance with Title
77, Chapter 16a.
(b) The mental health adviser shall possess the qualifications necessary to
carry out the duties imposed by the board and may not be employed by the
Department of Corrections or the Utah State Hospital.
(i) The Board of Pardons and Parole may review outside employment by
the mental health advisor.
(ii) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall develop rules governing
employment with entities other than the board by the mental health advisor
for the purpose of prohibiting a conflict of interest.
(c) The mental health adviser shall:
(i) act as liaison for the board with the Department of Human Services
and local mental health authorities;
(ii) educate the members of the board regarding the needs and special
circumstances of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system;
(iii) in cooperation with the Department of Corrections, monitor the
status of persons in the prison who have been found guilty and mentally ill;
(iv) monitor the progress of other persons under the board's jurisdiction
who are mentally ill;
(v) conduct hearings as necessary in the preparation of reports and
recommendations; and
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(vi) perform other duties as assigned by the board.
Laws 1985, c. 198, § 7; Laws 1986, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 122, § 28; Laws 1990, c.
195, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 114, § 26; Laws 1992, c. 171, § 16; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 32;
Laws 1994, c. 223, § 17; Laws 1996, c. 117, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c 308,
§ 15, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 13, § 91, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 22, § 1,
eff. May 4, 1998, Laws 2002, c. 176, § 80, eff. May 6, 2002.
Cross References
Corrections department, see § 64-13-1 et seq
Pardon and parole board, governor's powers, see Const Art 7, § 12
Administrative Code References
Pardons and parole, competency of offenders, see Utah Admin Code 671-206
Library References
Pardon and Parole <3=»55 1
Westlaw Key Number Search
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amendment but it also means until provided by
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in Constitution, and the authorization to "otherwise provide by law" was carried out by enactment of 1951 statute which created board of
pardons in valid form Const art 7, § 12, art
23, §§ 1-3, U C A 1 9 5 3 , 77-62-2 Adnano v

Privilege or immunity
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Parole board's standards and criteria,
b o a r d f a i l e d tQ c r e d l t h l s s e n .
tence 42 U S C A § 1983 Malek v Haun,
1994, 26 F 3d 1013 Civil Rights &=> 1376(7),
Pardon And Parole <&* 56
Claim by prisoner, under civil rights law,
seeking monetary damages against member of
Board of Pardons was barred as members of
Board were absolutely immune from damages
liability for actions taken in performance of
their official duties regarding granting or denying of parole 42 U S C A § 1983 Houtz v
Deland, 1989, 718 F Supp 1497 Civil Rights
<&=> 1376(7)
and

that parole

§ 77-27-3.

Repealed by Laws 1985, c. 213, § 10

§ 77-27-4.

Chairperson and vice chairperson

(1) The governor shall select one of the members of the board to serve as
chairperson and board administrator at the governor's pleasure. The chairperson may exercise the duties and powers, in addition to those established by this
chapter, necessary for the administration of daily operations of the board,
including personnel, budgetary matters, panel appointments, and scheduling of
hearings.
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(2) The chairperson shall appoint a vice chairperson to act in the absence of
the chairperson.
Laws 1985, c. 198, § 8; Laws 1989, c. 112, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 195, § 3.
Library References
Pardon and Parole <3=»55.1.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 284k55.1.

§ 77-27-5.

Board of Pardons and Parole authority

(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision
when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the
state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at
penal or correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as
otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chair
shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance
with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. The chair may participate on any panel and when doing
so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may designate the chair for
any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated,
except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other than by a
majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing
before the board.
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with
Section 77-38a-302.
(2)(a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing
shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsible for prosecution of the case, ihe sentencing court, law enforcement officials
responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible,
the victim or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are
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final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents
the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as
provided in Section 77-27-6.
(4) This chapter may not be construed a£ a denial of or limitation of the
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment.
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or
pardon the offense as provided. In the c^se of conviction for treason, the
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or
commute the sentence, or direct its execution(5) In determining when, where, and und^r what conditions offenders serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their
fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, the
board shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to make
xes\\tvft\on as ascei\2&cie& m accordance wftY> ^ ^asiA'aife «iA ptrafc&aresck
Section 77-38a-302, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or
forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence.
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall
consider the offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in
Section 76-3-202, and in accordance with Section 77-27-13.
Laws 1985, c. 213, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 22, § 2; J>ws 1988, c. 172, § 2; Laws 1990, c.
195, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 102; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 33; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 4, eff.
May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 100, § 4, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 9, eff. May
6, 2002.
Cross Referents
Extradition, payment of costs, see § 77-30-24
Administrative Code References
Rescission hearings, see Utah Admin. Code 671-310.
Library References
Pardon and Parole <S=>23 1, 28, 59, 62, 64 1,
C.J S Pardon and Parole §§ 1 to 2, 4 to 6, 11
85, 92.
to 16, 22 to 26, 29 to 30, 34 to 41, 55, 57,
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 284k23.1;
75, 79 to 80, 87.
2Mk2B; 2&4V59; 2Mk62; 2&4k64.1;
284k85; 284k92
Notes of Decisions
In general 2
Authority of board 7
Civil rights action 8
Class B misdemeanor 9
Conditions to paroles 10
Construction of sentence imposed
Double jeopardy 3

11

Due process 4
Extraordinary relief 20
Habeas corpus 21
judicial review 18
Jurisdiction of parole board 15
Mootness 14
Pleadings 1 6
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Note 21
of Appeals from reviewing dismissal of petition
for writ of habeas corpus challenging parole
hearing determination by Board that alleged
violation of state and federal constitutional
rights; nght to petition for habeas relief from
constitutional rights violations was guaranteed
S

nV!12U 7 7 ^ m P °^f ^
u'J
i
U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3). Padilla v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 1992, 839 P.2d 874. Habeas Corpus
«» 516.1, Habeas Corpus « » 814
*
-1 i_i
.
TT i
Habeas corpus was not available as postrelease remedy to modify release date ordered by
the Board of Pardons, even though parolee's
original scheduled parole date was rescinded by
Board of Pardons one day before parole date,
Board had right to rely on any factors known at
the time, including parolee's drug history, o r
later adduced at hearing ordered and had discretion to determine weight to be given to the
factors. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-202(1), (3)(c), (5),
77-27-5(3). Northern v. Barnes, 1992, 825

P.2d 696, certiorari granted, affirmed 870 P.2d
914. Habeas Corpus <S=» 516.1
statute precluding review of decisions of
B o a r d o f P a r d o n s d i d n o t p r e c l u d e prisoner
from
a l l e g i n g , 0 n appeal from dismissal of his
i t i o n for w r f t o f h a b e a g
which

his

arole hearin

that

manner

was

«
P
S
conducted de. ,,.
j
1j
J u- * J
led
"
him procedural due process and subjected
h l m t o double
f ° P a r d y . a s pnsoner did not
dispute merits or parole decision itself. U.C.A.
Ht h
D T d 1990 790
1QI5« ~ t '„ rt T T 1 ' ,0
J*~ OAT
P2d 49
Habeas Corpus ^ 845
If conditional termination of sentence was
void, convict had no complaint as to recommitment to prison, since compact pursuant to
which he was released would be nudum pacturn, and he could be afforded no relief on
habeas corpus from recommitment. Mansell v.
Turner, 1963, 14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P.2d 394.
Habeas Corpus <&> 517

§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 5 *3 • Meritless and bad faith litigation
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Convicted" means a conviction by entry of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, and conviction of any crime or
offense.
(b) "Prisoner" means a person who has been convicted of a crime and is
incarcerated for that crime or is being held in custody for trial or sentencing.
(2) In any case filed in state or federal court in which a prisoner submits a
claim that the court finds to be without merit and brought or asserted in bad
faith, the Board of Pardons and Parole and any county jail administrator may
consider that finding in any early release decisions concerning the prisoner.
Laws 1996, c. 161, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996.
Library References
Pardon and Parole <S=»49.
Westlaw Key Number Search- 284k49.

§ 77—27—5.5.

Review procedure—Commutation

(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole may consider the commutation of a
death sentence only to life without parole.
(2) Only the person who has been sentenced to death or his counsel may
petition the Board of Pardons and Parole for commutation.
(3) The petition shall be in writing, signed personally by the person sentenced to death, and shall include a statement of the grounds upon which the
petitioner seeks review.
(4) The state shall be permitted to respond in writing to the petition as may
be established by board rules.
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Note 2

(5) The board shall review the petition and determine whether the petition
presents a substantial issue which has not been reviewed in the judicial process.
(6) The board shall not consider legal issues, including constitutional issues,
which:
(a) have been reviewed previously by the courts;
(b) should have been raised during the judicial process; or
(c) if based on new information, are subject to judicial review.
(7)(a) If the board does not find a substantial issue, the board shall deny the
hearing to the petitioner.
(b) If the board finds a substantial issue, the board shall conduct a hearing
in which the petitioner and the state may present evidence and argument as
may be provided by board rules.
Laws 1992, c. 140, § 1, Laws 1994, c. 13, § 34.
Library References
Pardon and Parole <S=:>28
Westlaw Key Number Search 284k28
C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 4, 34 to 41
U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e Court
Clemency hearings,
Death sentences, clemency hearings, due
process, self-incrimination, executive
discretion, see Ohio Adult Parole Authority v Woodard, U S Ohio 1998, 118
S Ct 1244, 523 U S 272

Dumschat, U S Conn 1981, 101 S C t
2460, 452 U S 458, 69 L Ed 2d 158
Death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole, sentence commuted by
governor, Bnggs instruction, see California v Ramos, U S Cal 1983, 103
S Ct 3446, 463 U S 992, 77 L Ed 2d
1171, on remand 207 Cal Rptr 800, 37
Cal 3d 136, 689 P 2d 430
Habeas corpus, death penalty, inaccurate
instruction on governor s power to
commute life sentence without parole,
harmless-error standard, see Calderon
v Coleman, U S Cal 1998, 119 S C t
500, 525 U S 141

Commutation,
Commutation of death sentence to long
term sentences, see Rose v Hodges,
U S Tenn 1975, 96 S Ct 175, 423 U S
19, 46 L Ed 2d 162, rehearing denied
96 S C t 888, 423 U S
1092, 47
L E d 2 d 104
Commutation of life sentence, due process, see Connecticut Bd of Pardons v

N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
Due process 2
Retrospective and ex post facto laws

1. Retrospective and ex post facto laws
Application of statute creating new and higher substantive standard for obtaining commutation hearing, to petition for commutation hearing for crime which occurred before statute was
enacted would violate state constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws Const Art 1, § 18,
Art 7, § 12, U C A 1953, 77-27-5 5(6, 7) Andrews v Utah Bd of Pardons, 1992, 836 P 2d
790 Constitutional Law <3» 203 Pardon And
Parole <S» 22

Board of Pardons amended order denying
request for second commutation hearing applied constitutionally correct criteria, rather
than commutation hearing standard of statute
enacted after commission of crime, therefore,
Board did not violate constitutional prohibition
of ex post facto laws in denying second commutation hearing
Const Art 1, § 18, Art 7,
§ 12, U C A 1953, 77-27-5 5(6, 7) Andrews v
Utah Bd of Pardons, 1992, 836 P 2d 790 Constitutional Law <£=> 203, Pardon And Parole @=»
22
2.

Due process
Board of Pardons did not deny petitioner due
process of law in its reconsideration of his peti-
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United States Supreme Court

1990, 110 S C t 2126, 495 U S 552,
109 L Ed 2d 588
Bankruptcy, restitution obligation discharge, condition of probation, see Kelly v Robinson, U S Conn 1986, 107
S Ct 353, 479 U S 36, 93 L Ed 2d 216
Consideration of alternatives to incarceration before revocation, see Black v
Romano, U S Mo 1985, 105 S Ct 2254,
471 U S 606, 85 L Ed 2d 636, rehearing denied 105 S C t 3548, 473 U S
921, 87 L Ed 2d 671
Failure of indigent defendant to pay fine
and restitution, equal protection, see
Bearden v Georgia, U S Ga 1983, 103
S C t 2064, 461 U S 660, 76 L Ed 2d
221, on remand 167 Ga App 334, 308
S E 2d 63
Resentencing, drug possession, see U S
v Granderson, U S Ga 1994, 114 S Ct
1259, 511 U S 39, 127 L Ed 2d 611

Restitution,
In general,
Probation, revocation for failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and restitution, equal protection, see Bearden v
Georgia, U S Ga 1983, 103 S Ct 2064,
461 U S 660, 76 L Ed 2d 221, on remand 167 Ga App 334, 308 S E 2d 63
Amount of restitution,
Restitution calculation, losses caused by
offense of conviction, unauthorized use
of credit card, see Hughey v U S ,
U S Tex 1990, 110 S Ct 1979, 495 U S
411, 109 L E d 2 d 408, on remand 907
F2d39
Restitution as condition of probation,
Bankruptcy, dischargeability of restitution obligations imposed as conditions
of probation, see Pennsylvania Dept of
Public Welfare v Davenport U S Pa

N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
In general 1
Effect of parole termination

2.

2

1. In general
Board of Pardons and Parole had authority to
order restitution for three robbery offenses as
condition of parole even through original sentencing court had not ordered restitution as
part of underlying sentence
UCA1953,
77-27-5 77-27-6 Stilling v Utah Bd of Pardons and Parole, 1997, 933 P 2d 391 308 Utah
Adv Rep 39 Pardon And Parole ^ 64 1
Authority of Board of Pardons and Paroles to
impose restitution as condition of parole is not
limited to instances in which sentencing trial
court has failed to fulfill its statutory duty to
consider and impose restitution unless court
finds it inappropriate
U C A 1 9 5 3 77-27-5,
77-27-6 U C A 1 9 5 3 , 76-3-201 (1983) Stilling v Utah Bd of Pardons and Parole 1997
933 P 2d 391, 308 Utah Adv Rep 39 Pardon
And Parole <$=> 64 1

Effect of parole termination
After parolee's sentence and parole were terminated, Board of Pardons and Parole lacked
jurisdiction to issue restitution order that it then
forwarded to sentencing court to be entered as
a civil judgment
U C A 1953, 77-27-5(1),
77-27-6(2, 4) State v Schultz 2002, 56 P 3d
974, 456 Utah Adv Rep 28 2002 UT App 297
Pardon And Parole <S^ 93
Board of Pardons and Parole s restitution order issued after parolee's sentence and parole
were terminated was not a nunc pro tunc order
that related back to Board's special attention
hearing that was held when Board still had
jurisdiction over parolee and thus civil judgment against parolee that sentencing court imposed pursuant to the order was invalid
U C A 1 9 5 3 77-27-5(1) 77-27-6(2 4) State v
Schultz, 2002, 56 P 3d 974, 456 Utah Adv Rep
28, 2002 UT App 297 Pardon And Parole <3=>
93

§ 77—27-7. Parole or hearing dates—Interview—Hearings—Report of alienists—Mental competency
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine within six months after
the date of an offender's commitment to the custody of the Department of
Corrections, for serving a sentence upon conviction of a felony or class A
misdemeanor offense, a date upon which the offender shall be afforded a
hearing to establish a date of release or a date for a rehearing, and shall
promptly notify the offender of the date
(2) Before reaching a final decision to release any offender under this
chapter, the chair shall cause the offender to appear before the board, its panel,
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or any appointed hearing officer, who shall personally interview the offender to
consider his fitness for release and verify as far as possible information
furnished from other sources. Any offender may waive a personal appearance
before the board. Any offender outside of the state shall, if ordered by the
board, submit to a courtesy hearing to be held by the appropriate authority in
the jurisdiction in which the offender is housed in lieu of an appearance before
the board. The offender shall be promptly notified in writing of the board's
decision.
(3)(a) In the case of an offender convicted of violating or attempting to
violate any of the provisions of Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection
76-5-302(l)(b)(vi), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3,
76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, the chair may
appoint one or more alienists who shall examine the offender within six months
prior to a hearing at which an original parole date is granted on any offense
listed in this Subsection (3).
(b) The alienists shall report in writing the results of the examination to the
board prior to the hearing. The report of the appointed alienists shall
specifically address the question of the offender's current mental condition
and attitudes as they relate to any danger the offender may pose to children
or others if the offender is released on parole.
(4) The parolee may petition the board for termination of lifetime parole as
provided in Section 76-3-202 in the case of a person convicted of a first degree
felony violation or convicted of attempting to violate Section 76-5-301.1,
Subsection 76-5-302(l)(b)(vi), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2,
76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405.
(5) In any case where an offender's mental competency is questioned by the
board, the chair may appoint one or more alienists to examine the offender and
report in writing to the board, specifically addressing the issue of competency.
(6) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the board shall make rules governing:
(a) the hearing process;
(b) alienist examination; and
(c) parolee petitions for termination of parole.
Laws 1985, c. 213, § 3; Laws 1986, c 22, § 4, Laws 1988, c 150, § 1, Laws 1990, c.
195, § 5; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 36, Laws 1996, c. 100, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996, Laws
1998, c. 69, § 3, eff May 4, 1998, Laws 2001, c. 301, § 8, eff April 30, 2001, Laws
2001, 1st Sp. Sess., c 4, § 3, eff. July 5, 2001
Administrative Code References
Pardons and parole, rules and regulations, see Utah Admin Code 671
Library References
Pardon and Parole <S=>59, 60
Westlaw Key Number Searches* 284k59,
284k60
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Note 15
tional rights U C A 1953, 77-27-7(1), U C A
1953, 77-27-7 (Repealed) Malek v Sawaya,
1986, 730 P 2d 629 Habeas Corpus <£=> 506

§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 8 . Record of hearing
(1) A verbatim record of proceedings before the Board of Pardons and Parole
shall be maintained by a certified shorthand reporter or suitable electronic
recording device, except when the board dispenses with a record in a particular
hearing or a portion of the proceedings.
(2) When the hearing involves the commutation of a death sentence, a
certified shorthand reporter, in addition to mechanical means, shall record all
proceedings except when the board dispenses with a record for the purpose of
deliberations in executive session. The compensation of the reporter shall be
determined by the board. The reporter shall immediately file with the board
the original record and when requested shall with reasonable diligence furnish
a transcription or copy of the record upon payment of reasonable fees as
determined by the board.
(3) When the party in interest affirms by affidavit that he is unable to pay for
a transcript or copy of the record which is necessary for further proceedings
available to him, and that affidavit is not refuted, the board may order the
reporter to furnish to the party in interest a transcript, or a copy of the record,
or so much of it as is reasonably applicable to any further proceedings, or a
copy of the recording, at the expense of the state, to the party in interest.
Laws 1985, c 213, § 4, Laws 1994, c 13, § 37
Administrative Code References
Records and transcripts of hearings, >ee Utah Admin Code 671-304
Library References
Pardon and Parole <s»59
Westlaw Key Number Search 284k59
C J S Pardon and Parole § 55

§ 77—27-9. Parole proceedings
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole may pardon or parole any offender
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender committed to a penal or
correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections for
a felony or class A misdemeanor except as provided m Subsection (2).
(b) The board may not release any offender before the minimum term has
been served unless the board finds mitigating circumstances which justify the
release and unless the board has granted a full hearing, in open session, after
previous notice of the time and place of the hearing, and recorded the
proceedings and decisions of the board.
(c) The board may not pardon or parole any offender or commute or
terminate the sentence of any offender unless the board has granted a full
hearing, in open session, after previous notice of the time and place of the
hearing, and recorded the proceedings and decisions of the board.
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(d) The release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board, which
shall consider each case as the offender becomes eligible. However, a
prisoner may submit his own application, subject to the rules of the board
promulgated in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.
(2)(a) A person sentenced to prison prior to April 29, 1996, for a first degree
felony involving child kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; aggravated kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-302; rape of a child, a violation of
Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3;
sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, a violation of Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); aggravated sexual
assault, a violation of Section 76-5-405; or a prior offense as described in
Section 76-3-407, may not be eligible for release on parole by the Board of
Pardons and Parole until the offender has fully completed serving the minimum
mandatory sentence imposed by the court. This subsection supersedes any
other provision of law.
(b) The board may not parole any offender or commute or terminate the
sentence of any offender before the offender has served the minimum term
for the offense, if the offender was sentenced prior to April 29, 1996, and if:
(i) the offender was convicted of forcible sexual abuse, forcible sodomy,
rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, or aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the
Person; and
(ii) the victim of the offense was under 18 years of age at the time the
offense was committed.
(c) For a crime committed on or after April 29, 1996, the board may parole
any offender under Subsections (2)(b)(i) and (ii) for lifetime parole as provided in Section 77-27-9.
(d) The board may not pardon or parole any offender or commute or
terminate the sentence of any offender who is sentenced to life in prison
without parole except as provided in Subsection (6).
(e) On or after April 27, 1992, the board may commute a sentence of death
only to a sentence of life in prison without parole.
(f) The restrictions imposed in Subsections 77-27-9(2)(d) and (e) apply to
all cases that come before the Board of Pardons and Parole on or after April
27, 1992.
(3) The board may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence, to administer oaths, and to take testimony for
the purpose of any investigation by the board or any of its members or by a
designated hearing examiner in the performance of its duties. A person who
willfully disobeys a properly served subpoena issued by the board is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor.
(4)(a) The board may adopt rules consistent with law for its government,
meetings and hearings, the conduct of proceedings before it, the parole and
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pardon of offenders, the commutation and termination of sentences, and the
general conditions under which parole may be granted and revoked.
(b) The rules shall ensure an adequate opportunity for victims to participate at hearings held under this chapter, as provided in Section 77-27-9.5.
(c) The rules may allow the board to establish reasonable and equitable
time limits on the presentations by all participants in hearings held under this
chapter.
(5) The board does not provide counseling or therapy for victims as a part of
their participation in any hearing under this chapter.
(6) The board may parole a person sentenced to life in prison without parole
if the board finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is permanently incapable of being a threat to the safety of society
L a w s 1 9 8 5 , c 2 1 3 , § 5, L a w s 1986, c 2 2 , § 5,
172, § 3 , L a w s 1992, c 142 § 5, L a w s 1994, c
M a y 1, 1 9 9 5 , L a w s 1995, 1st S p Sess , c 10, §
4 0 , § 14, eff April 2 9 , 1996, L a w s 1996, c 100,
149, § 6, eff M a y 5, 2 0 0 3

L a w s 1986, c 4 1 , § 3 ,
13, § 3 8 , L a w s 1995, c
12, eff April 2 9 , 1996,
§ 6, eff April 2 9 , 1996,

L a w s 1988, c
3 3 7 , § 12, eff
L a w s 1996, c
Laws 2003, c

Cross References
Sex offenses, applicability of sentencing provisions, see § 76-5-406 3
Administrative Code References
News media and public access, see Utah Admin Code 671-302
Notification of hearings, see Utah Admin Code 671-202
Library References
Pardon and Parole <&*2 8 44 50 5 8 , 5 9
Westlaw Key Number Searches
284k28,
284k44 284L50 284k58 284k59

C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 4 34 to 41 52 to
55

U n i t e d States S u p r e m e Court
Parole,
Liberty interest in parole release, see
Board of Pardons v Allen, U S Mont
1987, 107 S Ct 2415, 482 U S 369, 96
L Ed 2d 303
Parole release, expectation as protected
liberty interest, see Jago v Van Curen,
U S O h i o l 9 8 1 , 102 S O 31, 454 U S
14 70 L E d 2d 13
Preparole conditional supervision, due
process protections, see Young v Harper, U S O k l a l 9 9 7 , 117 S Ct 1148
520 U S 143, 137 L Ed 2d 270
Parole hearings,
Deferral of parole hearings ex post facto,
see California Dept of Corrections v
Morales, U S Cal 1995, 115 S Ct 1597,
514 U S 499, 131 L Ed 2d 588, on remand 56 F 3d 46
Requisites of parole procedure, see
Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska Pe-

nal
and
Correctional
Complex,
U S Neb 1979, 99 S Ct 2100, 442 U S
1 60 L Ed 2d 668 on remand 602 F 2d
155
Retroactive change in frequency of parole
reconsideration hearings, significant
risk of increased punishment, ex post
facto, see Garner v Jones, U S Ga
2000, 120 S Ct 1362, 529 U S 244
_
Revocation of parole,
Habeas corpus, parole revocation, m-cust0<
ty requirement, collateral consequences, see Spencer v
Kemna,
U S MO 1998, 118 S Ct 978, 523 U S
1
Right to parole,
Scope of agency authority, statute denying early release foi prisoners convicted of violent offenses, regulation denying early release to prisoners convicted
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Cross References

State prison, victim notification of offender's release, see § 64-13-14 7

Administrative Code References
Notification of Board decision, see Utah Admin Code 671-305

Library References
Pardon and Parole @=»57 1
Westlaw Key Number Search

284k57 1

§ 77—27—10. Conditions of parole—Rulemaking—Intensive early release
parole program
(l)(a) When the Board of Pardons and Parole releases an offender on parole,
it shall issue to the parolee a certificate setting forth the conditions of parole
which he shall accept and agree to as evidenced by his signature affixed to the
agreement.
(b) A copy of the agreement shall be delivered to the Department of
Corrections and a copy shall be given to the parolee. The original shall
remain with the board's file.
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to violate Section
76-5-301.1,
Subsection
76-5-302(1), Section
76-5-402, 76-5-402.1,
76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or
76-5-405, is released on parole, the board shall order outpatient mental health
counseling and treatment as a condition of parole. The board shall develop
standards and conditions of parole under this subsection in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. This subsection
does not apply to intensive early release parole.
(3)(a) In addition to the conditions set out in Subsection (1), the board may
place offenders in an intensive early release parole program. The board shall
determine the conditions of parole which are reasonably necessary to protect
the community as well as to protect the interests of the offender and to assist
the offender to lead a law-abiding life.
(b) The offender is eligible for this program only if he:
(i) has not been convicted of a sexual offense; or
(ii) has not been sentenced pursuant to Section 76-3-406.
(c) The department shall:
(i) promulgate rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, for operation of the program;
(ii) adopt and implement internal management policies for operation of
the program;
(iii) determine whether or not to refer an offender into this program
within 120 days from the date the offender is committed to prison by the
sentencing court; and
(iv) make the final recommendation to the board regarding the placement of an offender into the program.
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(d) The department shall not consider credit for time served in a county
jail awaiting trial or sentencing when calculating the 120 day period.
(e) The prosecuting attorney or sentencing court may refer an offender for
consideration by the department for participation in the program.
(f) The board shall determine whether or not to place an offender into this
program within 30 days of receiving the department's recommendation.
(4) This program shall be implemented by the department within the existing
budget.
(5) During the time the offender is on parole, the department shall collect
from the offender the monthly supervision fee authorized by Section 64-13-21.
Laws 1985, c. 213, § 6; Laws 1986, c 22, § 6, Laws 1993, c. 35, § 1; Laws 1993, c
220, § 4, Laws 1994, c 13, § 41, Laws 1996, c 100, § 7, eff April 29, 1996
Cross References
Sentence, term and construction, see § 77-18-4
Library References
Pardon and Parole <®=*64 1, 69
Westlaw Key Number Searches
284k69

C J S Pardon and Parole § 65
284k64 1,

Notes of Decisions
In general 1
Acceptance or rejection by prisoner
Due process °
Enforcement 4
Restitution 6
Right to hearing
1.

In general
Parolees do not enjoy absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled but only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance
of special parole restrictions
U S v Lewis,
1995, 71 F 3d 358 Pardon And Parole &* 64 1
Board of parole may, in its discretion attach
conditions to paroles and termination of sentences V n e z e v Turner 1966 18 Utah 2d 233
419 P 2 d 769
Pardon And Parole <&* 64 1
2.

Due process
Once paroled, offenders have a liberty interest
that is limited by the restrictions that govern
parole it is nevertheless a liberty interest which
is entitled to due process protection U S C A
Const Amend 14 Linden v State, Dept of
Corrections, 2003, 81 P 3d 802, 499 Utah Adv
Rep 34, 2003 UT App 402 Constitutional Law
®» 272 5, Pardon And Parole <&* 64 1
3.

Acceptance or rejection by prisoner
Authority of Board of Pardons under Constitution and statute to release prisoners on condition is plenary and while prisoner may reject

conditions and serve out term, he may not accept them, obtain release from confinement,
and then blithely contend that his sentence is
terminated Const art 1, §§ 3, 9, 26, art 7,
^ 12, U S C A C o n s t Amends 5, 6, 14, U C A
1953, 77-62-3
Mansell v Turner, 1963, 14
Utah 2d 352, 384 P 2d 394 Pardon And Parole
<3=»65
4.

Enforcement
Board of Pardons did not violate fundamental
fairness when it refused to credit inmate's time
served in secured treatment program as condition of probation against inmate's prison sentence, when sentencing court grants probation,
it must have adequate means of enforcing conditions of that probation and, without threat of
potential future incarceration, conditions of
probation become meaningless Const Art 1,
$ 7 Rawhngs v Holden, 1994, 869 P 2d 958
Constitutional Law @=» 272 5, Pardon And Parole <&* 64 1
f5. Right to hearing
Inmate who objected to restitution order imposed by Board of Pardons and Parole as condition of parole was not entitled to full hearing
before Board on his objections, where he instead chose to seek extraordinary relief via petition for writ of habeas corpus
U C A 1953,
76-3-20 l(4)(e), 77-27-5, Utah Admin Code
071-403-2 Monson v Carver, 1996, 928 P 2d
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NATALIE A. WINTCH (#9213)
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MARK SHURTLEFF(#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
PO Box 140812
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812
Telephone: (801) 366-0216

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL BRIAN WHITEMAN,

ORDER OF THE COURT

Petitioner,
vs.

:

CLINT FRIEL, et. al.,
Respondents.

Case No. 040900113
Judge L.A. DEVER

:

Having carefully reviewed the pleadings submitted by both parties, being fully advised in
the premises, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following Order of the
Court.

ORDER
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

A jury convicted Petitioner of murder, a first degree felony. On November 22, 1993, he
was sentenced to a maximum mandatory term of five-years-to-life.

2.

On November 12, 1996, the Board held an original hearing which resulted in a rehearing
set for April 2003.

3.

On April 5, 1999, Petitioner's sentence was amended, showing a change from a
"maximum mandatory term of five years and which may be fore life" to a "not less than
five years and which may be for life."

4.

In preparation for the April 5, 1999 hearing, a new Presentence Investigation Report was
prepared.

5.

Petitioner requested a redetermination hearing.

6.

The Board conducted a Special Attention Review. After considering the information
Petitioner provided, the Board determined not to change the previously scheduled April
2003 rehearing.

7.

Petitioner was informed that in assessing the guidelines/matrix, the Board "considers
sentences imposed on convictions in other states, not whether the other state calls the
offense a misdemeanor or felony. This is based on the fact that felonies and
misdemeanors differ from state to state. An offense Utah might classify as a felony,
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California may classify as a misdemeanor. So, if the sentence imposed by California
corresponds to a Utah felony sentence, the offense is counted as a felony on the matrix.
Your matrix/guidelines have been refigured with the new presentence investigation
report, but no change was made in the final guideline time."
8.

On April 10, 2003, the Board conducted a rehearing and decided to parole Petitioner on
April 6, 2004. The Board also ordered two special conditions of parole: (1) cooperate
with transitional services which may include a Community Correctional Center as
directed by Adult Probation and Parole; (2) successfully complete mental health therapy
to address substance abuse and cognitive restructuring issues.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The standard of review in Board cases is well established: while the Court "must review
the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing function,. . . [the
court does] not sit as a panel of review on the result." Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097,
1100 (Utah 1994) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869
P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994) (citing Labrum v. Utah State Bd of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902,
910 (Utah 1993))).

2.

Petitioner complains the Board of Pardons (Board) adjusted his California sentences to
coincide with what the sentences would be in Utah when it prepared his Criminal History
Assessment and Time Matrix Guidelines. The Board has the right to "rely on any factors
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known . . . or later adduced . . . , and the weight to be afforded such factors in deciding
whether [a prospective parolee] pose[s] a societal risk . . . are all matters within the
discretion of the Board. They are precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to
judicial review . . . ." Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App. 1992). See also
Walker v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 902 P.2d 148, 150 (Utah App. 1995) ("[i]t is within
the discretion of the Board to weigh all of the evidence . ..").
3.

The Board properly exercised its discretion in weighing Petitioner's California offenses.
To maintain consistency, the Board ''considers sentences imposed on convictions in other
states, not whether the other state calls the offense a misdemeanor or felony. This is
based on the fact that felonies and misdemeanors differ from state to state." For example,
in California, Petitioner was convicted of Attempted Grand Theft and sentenced to thirtysix months probation and 360 days in jail. Although California considered this offense a
misdemeanor, in Utah the sentence imposed would make the offense a felony. Therefore,
the Board treated this offense as a felony as the sentence comports with a felony in Utah.
Five of Petitioner's California offenses were determined to be felonies as the sentences
constituted felonies in Utah. As a result, Petitioner was properly attributed with five prior
felony convictions on his Criminal History Assessment. As noted previously, the Board
has discretion in determining the weight to be afforded in such circumstances, and these
"are precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to judicial review . .. ." Northern,

4

. 1 1

825 P.2d at 699. The Board did not abuse its discretion when it weighed Petitioner's
prior California sentences.
Petitioner complains that his incarceration was extended due to the Board's adjusting his
California sentences to comport with Utah sentences. Petitioner fails to state a claim.
Utah courts have consistently held that "the state sentencing guidelines do not have the
force and effect of law." Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 511 (Utah 1994) (citing Labrum
v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911-12 (Utah 1993)). Further, "any
'expectation of release' derived from the guidelines is at best tenuous." Id. "So long as
the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's
applicable indeterminate range, then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot
be arbitrary and capricious." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996)
(quotation omitted).
In this case, Petitioner was sentenced to five-years-to-life. The Board, in exercising its
discretion, could have denied Petitioner any parole date, resulting in the maximum term
of life in prison. Petitioner's sentence has not expired. Petitioner requested a
redetermination hearing based on his complaint that the Board adjusted his California
sentences to reflect Utah convictions. The Board reviewed the request and determined
not to change his status. The Board exercised its discretion; this is not arbitrary or
capricious.
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Petitioner requests the Court order his sentence and parole be terminated. These remedies
are unavailable. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that a district court exceeds its
authority when it orders an inmate released. Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah
1994). "In our indeterminate sentencing scheme, the board of pardons acts as a
sentencing entity, having exclusive authority to 'determine the actual number of years a
defendant is to serve.'" Id. (quoting Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d
902, 907 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Additionally, "not every circumstance that
gives rise to extraordinary relief compels the immediate release of a petitioner from every
aspect of physical imprisonment." Id. (citing Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 900
(Utah 1981) (holding that remedy for unlawful condition of confinement is elimination of
that specific condition of physical imprisonment, not release from every aspect of
physical imprisonment) (citations omitted). Petitioner requested a rehearing to consider
the new presentence report and his claims that the Board improperly adjusted his
California sentences. The Board conducted a Special Attention Review and decided not
to change his April 2003 rehearing. Subsequently, on April 10, 2003, the Board
conducted the rehearing at which time Petitioner had full opportunity to raise these issues.
After the hearing, the Board decided to parole Petitioner on April 6, 2004. The Board
properly used its discretion, and Petitioner received the necessary due process.
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ORDERED by the Court this
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF THE
COURT, postage prepaid, on this ^/ffiiav of April 2004 to the following:

Michael Brian Whiteman
USP #22588
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
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